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Heuristic Reasoning and Sport Observers: 
Exploring the influence of Example-Availability on 
Ad-Hoc Frequency Judgments 
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Introduction:  When performing everyday reasoning tasks ‘on-the-fly’, individuals rarely attempt a 
comprehensive examination of all relevant resources from social memory. More commonly, 
metacognitive ‘short-cutting’ strategies – judgemental heuristics – are employed to expedite these 
tasks. The most robustly demonstrated ‘heuristic’ is the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 
1973; 1974). This heuristic, describes the manner in which estimations of frequency or probability 
tend to be inducted from the information most cognitively salient to an individual, i.e. task-relevant 
examples that can be easily recalled have a disproportionately high frequency/probability estimation. 
Incorporating ‘fame availability’ (Mekelvie 1997) the empirical focus of the study was on the ‘snap 
judgements’ made by observers of sport images.  
 
Methods:  Subjects (n=141) were shown a variety (50) of images of football, tennis, golf, netball, running 
athletes in action from the public domain. Images were grouped and divided into celebrity (high profile 
professional athletes in football, tennis, golf) and non-celebrity (low profile recreation athletes participating 
in netball and running). In a time-pressured environment, participants estimated the frequency of images 
observed for each sport. The scores of the five sports, consisting the two groups were averaged to provide a 
single participant value for celebrity and non-celebrity sports. 
 
Results: Normality of data was checked using Kolmogorov-Smirnoff and subsequently confirmed. A paired t-
test was used to examine for difference between the two groups. Frequency scores for celebrity sports 
(12.0±3.3 times) were significantly more (t136 = 7.394, P = 0.001) than non-celebrity sports (9.9±3.3 
times).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion:  
Heuristics are an adaptive tool (Gigerenzer, 2006)  which have the potential to produce effective on-
the-spot judgements. However these results suggest that significant distortions of frequency may 
arise through the influence of heuristics when observing sport from the peripherary. Given the 
contextual ambiguity influencing those centrally involved in sport (coaches, referees, participants, 
commentators) and the importance of decision-making under time constraints, further research on 
the influence of heuristics in the decision making of sport practitioners is recommended.  
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Fig. 1. Mean scores of celebrity and  non-celebrity. 
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